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Abstract Historically, climate governance initiatives and associated scholarship have all but
ignored the potential for Bglobal moral norms^ to bring about changes in the political conditions
for global climatemitigation. This is surprising, since globalmoral norms arewidely employed—as
both a mode of governance and an analytical framework—in other domains of global governance,
from international security to human rights. However, recent national-level fossil fuel divestments,
moratoria on new coal mines and bans on gas fracking, among other developments, suggest the
promise of global moral norms prohibiting fossil fuel-related activities, which this article terms
Banti-fossil fuel norms^ (AFFNs). The article interprets recent examples of such activities in the
light of international relations theory on moral norms to provide a general framework for
understanding how AFFNs originate, spread and affect states. Specifically, the article argues that
there are: (i) influential agents that are originating, and likely to continue to originate, AFFNs; and
(ii) international and domestic mechanisms by which AFFNs are likely to spread widely among
states and have a significant causal effect on the identity-related considerations or rational calcu-
lations of states in the direction of limiting or reducing the production or consumption of fossil
fuels. The article also shows that, because they spread and affect state behaviour through mecha-
nisms of Binternational socialization^ and domestic Bpolitical mobilization^, AFFNs cohere with
and build upon the new paradigm of global climate governance crystallized in the Paris Agreement.
AFFNs, the article concludes, represent a promising new frontier in climate governance.
1 Introduction
Testing nuclear weapons, owning slaves and waging aggressive war were all once normal
practices—in some cases, for much of human history. Today, robust global moral norms
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socially condition states and their citizens to see these practices as morally wrong, and to
regulate them accordingly. What prospect is there for the exploitation of fossil fuels to meet the
same fate?
Not long ago, the prospect might have seemed fantastical. But recent national-level fossil
fuel divestments,1 commitments to phase out coal-fired power stations,2 moratoria on new
coalmines3 and bans on gas fracking4 suggest otherwise. These and other recent political and
policy developments concerning fossil fuels can usefully be interpreted—in the light of
international relations theory on global moral norms—as practices that instantiate what I call
Banti-fossil fuel norms^ (AFFNs). AFFNs, I argue, constitute a promising new frontier in
climate governance (construed broadly as authoritative social steering toward a collective
climate change goal: cf. Andonova et al. 2009; Gunningham 2017a, 316).
A norm is a standard of appropriate behaviour that is expected of an agent with a particular
identity (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891). A global moral norm is a norm that (i) pertains to
states and globally significant non-state actors (such as international organizations and multi-
national corporations) and (ii) originates from concerted attempts to change what counts as
appropriate behaviour for those agents in line with a conception of justice or ethics. Especially
relevant to the present article are global moral norms whose moral-normative content consists
in the direct prohibition of some action, process or product—for example, the construction of
new coalmines. These features distinguish the kind of norms with which I am concerned from
various related ideational phenomena. First, their moral content distinguishes them from social
norms whose content is merely conventional/customary. Second, their global scope, and their
focus on states and globally significant non-state actors, distinguishes them from norms with
merely local scope and/or applicable to other kinds of actors. Third, their deontic content
distinguishes them from merely conceptual phenomena in the international climate regime
(e.g. Bsustainable development^). Fourth, their specific focus on direct prohibition distin-
guishes them from the more abstract, less determinate normative theories and principles that
have been extensively analyzed by philosophers, international lawyers and climate policy
scholars (e.g. Bclimate justice^, Bcommon but differentiated responsbilities^).5
The potential role of global moral norms (of the kindwith which I am concerned) as amode of
climate governance has been almost entirely neglected by scholars.6 For example, it is not
covered in either the BInternational Cooperation^ chapter of the IPCC’sWorkingGroup III report
(Stavins et al. 2014) or the 600-page Research Handbook on Climate Governance (Bäckstrand
and Lövbrand 2015). This neglect is probably partly explained by the way the international
climate regime has evolved (see Online Resource 1). Nonetheless, the neglect is striking.
Following the literature on how global moral norms originate, spread and effect change, I
argue that there are (i) influential agents that are originating, and likely to continue to originate,
AFFNs (Section 2); and (ii) domestic and international processes by which AFFNs are likely
1 See, e.g., Osborne (2017).
2 See the Powering Past Coal Alliance (Government of Canada 2017), discussed in Section 3.2.1, below.
3 See Blondeel and Van de Graaf (2018).
4 See https://keeptapwatersafe.org/global-bans-on-fracking/.
5 That said, AFFNs are related in various ways to some of these other kinds of ideational phenomena (see Online
Resource 1).
6 Exceptions include a number of contributions to a special issue of Law & Policy on fossil fuel divestment,
published in October 2017 (see especially Gunningham 2017a, 2017b). Before that, the potential value of
developing new climate-related global moral norms was discussed in Raymond et al. (2014) and mentioned
briefly by Caney (2014, 137–38) and Drahos and Downie (2016, 7). See also Blondeel and Van de Graaf (2018).
Climatic Change
to spread widely among states and have a significant causal effect on the identity-related
considerations or rational calculations of states in the direction of limiting or reducing the
production or consumption of fossil fuels (Section 3). These processes are, respectively,
domestic Bpolitical mobilization^ (Section 3.1) and Binternational socialization^ (Section 3.2).
Political mobilization and international socialization processes are, it so happens, central to
the Bnew global climate governance approach^ crystallized in the Paris Agreement (Falkner
2016, 1108), whichmarks a critical departure from previous international attempts to govern the
climate using hierarchical mechanisms involving enforceable incentives, including regulated-
market mechanisms, as exemplified by the Kyoto Protocol. Because of this change in the
international climate policy paradigm, along with innovation in energy systems and shifts in the
interests of powerful states, global structural conditions are more conducive to the spread of
AFFNs than they were even at the beginning of this decade, let alone in the 1990s or 2000s.
This structural context is discussed further in the online supplement (Online Resource 1), which
provides useful background to the main claims advanced in this article.
Methodologically, this article’s contribution is theoretical. Its main claims add up to a
general model or framework for explaining how AFFNs originate, spread and affect states—
and how they are likely to do so in future. Accordingly, my claims are primarily supported by
reference to established theory; providing detailed empirical support is beyond the scope of the
article. However, illustrative evidence from recent political behaviour concerning fossil fuels,
discussed throughout the paper, enhances the plausibility of these claims, which can be used as
testable hypotheses in future systematic empirical work. Given the historical neglect of moral
norms in climate governance research, it is hoped that this contribution will open up a valuable
new frontier in research on both climate governance and international norms, and also help
AFFN proponents to reflect critically on their practices.
2 The emergence of AFFNs: norm entrepreneurs and norm champions
Global moral norms are often originated by norm entrepreneurs—typically individuals who
are highly motivated to overcome a perceived injustice/problem and who work through an
organizational platform (such as an NGO, a social movement, or an international organization)
to get a new standard of behaviour normalized in the international system (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998, 895–901).7 The existing (unjust/problematic) practice that norm entrepreneurs
seek to change will, by definition, be Bnormal^ and subject to its own Blogics of
appropriateness^ (March and Olsen 1996), around which various interests have coalesced.
Accordingly, norm entrepreneurs must challenge those existing logics and interests using
creative tactics (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 897).
Norm entrepreneurs can be distinguished from Bnorm champions^—enthusiastic early
adopters of a norm who pressure others to adopt the norm (Fitzsimmons 2009).8 Norm
champions can be state or non-state actors and can operate via domestic or international
channels (cf. Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902; Fitzsimmons 2009, 12). Norm entrepreneurs
and champions often become linked through Btransnational advocacy networks^ that agitate
for normative change at multiple levels (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
7 Norm entrepreneurs could also be public officials working through a state, though this is atypical.
8 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 902) call them Bagents of socialization^. The distinction between norm
entrepreneurs and norm champions is not especially important in practice—both are Bagents of socialization^.
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AFFNs have to date originated from or been advocated by at least four kinds of norm
entrepreneurs or champions. They have mostly originated from individuals and organizations
within civil society in the years following the failed Copenhagen climate conference (see
Online Resource 1). An example is the prominent environmental activist, Bill McKibben (see
Schifeling and Hoffman 2017). Motivated by a conviction that building a social movement by
mobilizing moral outrage against fossil fuel companies is likely to be more politically effective
than previous climate efforts (McKibben 2012), McKibben sparked the social movement
campaigning for fossil fuel divestment and has championed protest action against new fossil
fuel infrastructure. Anti-fossil fuel initiatives are increasingly being endorsed by other, more
mainstream elites and organizations within civil society.9 Pope Francis, for example, endorsed
phasing out fossil fuels in his encyclical, Laudato Si′ (2015, para. 165).
International organizations and their senior executive officers are also originating and
championing AFFNs, including the IMF (Herbst-Bayliss 2016), World Bank (E. King 2014)
and OECD (Gurría 2015). Numerous state leaders have emerged in recent years as AFFN
champions. For example, former President Tong of Kiribati wrote to world leaders requesting
support for a global moratorium on new coalmines,10 and former US President Obama
initiated numerous domestic and international policy initiatives directly targeting fossil fuels.
Finally, many subnational governments have championed AFFNs, such as bans on uncon-
ventional gas Bfracking^ in their jurisdictions.11 The structural factors analyzed in Online
Resource 1 help to explain why these kinds of actors came to advocate AFFNs. Judging by
their recent activity, it seems likely that these kinds of agents will continue to originate and
champion AFFNs (see also Cheon and Urpelainen 2018).
3 The spread and effects of AFFNs
I turn now to establishing my claims that AFFNs are likely to spread widely among the
international system and have a significant causal effect on the identity-related considerations
or rational calculations of states in the direction of limiting or reducing the production or
consumption of fossil fuels.
The key theoretical concept used here is the feedback effect, which can be defined, for
present purposes, simply as an effect that a given political intervention has on a political
variable which, in turn, is a cause of a relevant future effect. The political variables could be
structural phenomena like institutions, resource distributions and available technology, or
agential phenomena like the identities, values, and preferences of agents. The Bpolicy feedback
effect^ is a theoretical construct widely employed by political scientists to explain how policy
interventions are not only the effects of (past) politics, but also the causes of (future) politics
and hence (future) policy outcomes (see, e.g., Pierson 1993). A policy intervention can have
Bpositive^ feedback effects, reinforcing the direction of the original change over time and/or
Bnegative^ feedback effects, causing political counter-reactions that work against the original
change (Pierson 1993). Policy feedback effects are beginning to be employed insightfully by
political scientists working on the politics of climate policy (e.g. Lockwood 2013; Urpelainen
9 See, e.g., Gunningham (2017a, 318–19) (on divestment); and http://www.nonewcoalmines.org.au/ (on the Bno
new coalmines^ norm).
10 President Tong’s letter is available from http://www.nonewcoalmines.org.au/president_of_kiribati.
11 See https://keeptapwatersafe.org/global-bans-on-fracking/.
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2013). But it is not only policy interventions that have feedback effects: norms also exhibit
complex dynamics that can appropriately be analyzed in terms of feedback effects. The below
discussion explicates the generic processes by which AFFNs are likely to have positive
feedback effects.
3.1 Pressure from within: political mobilization by domestic civil society
I first consider how AFFNs are likely to spread and affect states via political mobilization by
domestic civil society actors seeking to influence the state in which they operate.
Scholars of domestic social movements have recognized that political mobilization can
affect the rational (e.g., electoral) calculations of a state’s government and political parties in
ways that make it more likely that the state will adopt climate policies (McAdam 2017;
Nulman 2015). Bomberg defines political mobilization as Bgalvanizing resources and people
to participate actively^ in politics (Bomberg 2012, 408). She argues that, to influence climate
policy successfully, mobilization requires awareness-raising, alliance-building and multi-level
network-formation. Recently, increasing scholarly attention within the literature on norms has
been paid to the (counter-)mobilization of groups opposed to new moral norms and the effects
of such conflict on the norm’s content and diffusion (see Online Resource 1, Sec. 1). Domestic
anti-fossil fuel activists will undoubtedly continue to face fierce resistance from powerful
opponents protecting an entrenched status quo—not least the fossil fuel industry—with respect
to all elements of political mobilization. Accordingly, analysis of domestic mobilization
processes must take into account these oppositional dynamics, too.
Civil society activism built around AFFNs, I argue, is likely to be more effective with
respect to each of these three elements of political mobilization, and to undermining oppo-
nents’ counter-mobilization, compared with similar activism focused on climate change per se.
Consequently, AFFN-related activism is more likely to increase electoral incentives for
governments to limit or reduce fossil fuel production or consumption.
3.1.1 Awareness-raising and framing
In order to raise awareness and attract wide public support for their cause, global moral norms
must be compellingly Bframed^ by norm entrepreneurs/champions (Finnemore and Sikkink
1998; Gauri 2012). Generally, the literature on norm framing overlaps extensively with the
literature on Bcollective action framing^ by social movements (Benford and Snow 2000) and,
in this context, the interdisciplinary literature on climate-related framing/communication
(Corner et al. 2014; van der Linden et al. 2015; Moser 2016). Synthesizing from these
literatures, three findings about the links between framing and political mobilization are
pertinent. Frames are likely to be more resonant where they are:
(i) Intuitively plausible to lay audiences, in that they appeal to common sense understandings
of (a) facts/reality (e.g., personal experience and simple facts, rather than requiring
complex cognitive tasks or technical expertise) and (b) values/morality (e.g., values that
are widely-shared and intuitive, rather than narrowly-shared and requiring complex
utilitarian calculations);
(ii) Relevant to the audience’s everyday concerns and priorities; and
(iii) Delivered by messengers perceived by the target audience to be credible and in an
authoritative forum or context relevant to that audience.
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Motivating more engaged forms of participation in collective action (such as participation
in protests and other social movement activities) is likely to additionally require frames that
trigger intense emotions such as moral indignation or pride (Jasper 2011).
Based on these insights, AFFNs have the potential to be more effective at engaging the lay
public than the kinds of climate change norms historically appealed to by climate activists and
embedded in UN treaties (see Section 1 and Online Resource 1).
First, AFFNs are amenable to framing using clear and simple language. Fossil fuels and
associated infrastructure are readily understood by lay audiences. In contrast, concepts such as
greenhouse gases, B2°C average warming^, and B350 ppm^ are abstract, technical construc-
tions not readily grasped by laypersons (Gauri 2012, 11). Moreover, the prohibitionary AFFNs
with which I am concerned are straightforward deontological imperatives, whereas grasping
climate change goals typically requires cognitively demanding forms of ethical reasoning, such
as utilitarian calculation or the resolution of multiple conflicts among rights and duties (Green
2017). These features make the empirical and moral messages associated with AFFNs more
intuitively plausible (e.g., Bcoal kills: no new coalmines!^).
Second, AFFNs ameliorate a major challenge faced by climate campaigners: the harms
caused by climate change are causally complex and (perceived to be) remote from their cause
in time and space (van der Linden et al. 2015). The production, transport and consumption of
fossil fuels, however, in addition to causing climate change, cause and are popularly associated
with a range of other harms. These may include adverse local environmental, health and social
impacts, corruption, repressive governance practices, human rights abuses, energy insecurity,
and economic volatility. Most of these harms affect communities temporally and physically
proximate to the cause and in a direct and causally obvious, often physical way. These features
make the impacts of fossil fuel activities easier to understand, more intuitively morally wrong,
more relevant to the everyday concerns and priorities of target audiences, more likely to trigger
feelings of indignation among diverse groups, and ultimately more likely to motivate engaged
forms of social movement participation, compared with the impacts of climate change.
Third, AFFNs personalize the causes of climate change, thus strengthening the intuitiveness
of their moral wrongness and more readily triggering feelings of indignation, compared with a
climate change frame. As Keck and Sikkink note, Bproblems whose causes can be assigned to
deliberate (intentional) actions of identifiable individuals are amenable to advocacy network
strategies [including political mobilization] in ways that problems whose causes are irredeem-
ably structural are not^ (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 27). One of the reasons that climate change is
not psychologically salient is precisely that its cause is (perceived to be) structural: it is
(commonly framed as) an unintentional side-effect of the everyday actions of billions of
people. So understood, it lacks an identifiable causal agent intending the kind of wrongdoing
that automatically violates our moral intuitions (Markowitz and Shariff 2012, 244). Anti-fossil
fuel initiatives, by contrast, help to concentrate moral pressure on the largest culprits of climate
change, which makes such initiatives more effective at inspiring public anger/indignation
(McAdam 2017, 204). Indeed, this is a key factor motivating AFFN entrepreneurship,
especially the divestment movement (Gunningham 2017b, 378). As Bill McKibben has put
it, Bmovements require enemies^ and Bthe fossil-fuel industry … is Public Enemy Number
One^, noting that just six of the largest listed oil and gas companies alone hold reserves that
together Bwould use up more than a quarter of the remaining two-degree budget^ (McKibben
2012, citing Carbon Tracker Initiative 2011).
This concentration of moral pressure on fossil fuel companies is also an important means by
which anti-fossil fuel campaigners can undermine their more powerful opponents. While
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activist groups cannot come close to matching the fossil fuel industry’s financial resources, its
elite political relationships or its Bstructural^ power in our fossil fuel-dependent global
economy, they typically do enjoy considerable Bdiscursive^ and Bsymbolic^ power, meaning
battles over ideas and legitimacy tend to be less one-sided (Gunningham 2017b, 382–85;
Ayling 2017). Moralized anti-fossil fuel frames therefore play to activists’ comparative
advantage, threatening to stigmatize the fossil fuel industry in the eyes of the wider public
(Ansar et al. 2013; Seidman 2015) and to sap its legitimacy—a crucial intangible resource
affecting its ability to realize its objectives (Ayling 2017, 351).
To counter the mounting moral pressure and mitigate the risk of stigmatization, threatened
industries tend to deploy Bmoral^ counter-frames that attempt to justify their harmful practices,
and this is exactly what the fossil fuel industry is now doing (Ayling 2017, 358, 361; Jamieson
2017; Seidman 2015, 1033). Yet the industry’s moral justifications are often transparently
implausible, as with the coal industry’s public relations campaign that casts its objectives in
moral terms of helping the world’s energy poor (e.g., Sheppard 2014), and are thus easily
debunked or parodied.12 But the industry has also responded to the heightened moral pressure
of anti-fossil fuel activism by doubling down on its use of more naked, instrumental forms of
power. For example, political corruption and heavy-handed tactics to repress activist opposi-
tion have allegedly been deployed by proponents of the Keystone XL and Dakota Access
Pipelines (Federman 2013; S. King 2016; Rainforest Action Network et al. 2017, 52). Such
tactics, in turn, further deplete the company/industry’s legitimacy, undermine its Bmoral^
counter-frames, and further increase the likelihood of stigmatization.
Empirical evidence suggests that the framing resonance and awareness-raising potential of
AFFNs is strong. Survey evidence about energy sources in the USA andAustralia, for example,
supports the claim that anti-fossil fuel frames are likely to be more resonant than generic climate
change frames (Anonymous 2016; Ansolabehere and Konisky 2014; Kennedy 2017; Lewis
2017), and in China, local air pollution (caused by fossil fuels) is one of the highest issues of
public concern (Wike and Stokes 2016). Case studies indicate the potential for proposed fossil
fuel infrastructure to generate strong local opposition, conflict among opponents and propo-
nents/supporters, and wider media attention (Bomberg 2017; Cheon and Urpelainen 2018;
Connor 2016; Connor et al. 2009, 501–3; Ordner 2017). The divestment movement, with its
moralized anti-fossil fuel frame, has in a very short time, enhanced public discourse on climate
change, increasing the traction of both anti-fossil fuel messages and more mainstream, liberal
climate policy responses in public debate (Schifeling and Hoffman 2017; see also Ayling and
Gunningham 2017; Gunningham 2017a, 317–19; Seidman 2015, 1030–34).
3.1.2 Alliance-building and network-formation
AFFN-related frames also have advantages over traditional climate change frames with respect
to alliance-building and network-formation. The multiple negative impacts of fossil fuels at
multiple scales facilitate the building of strong, diverse alliances and networks whose constit-
uents share a common opponent.
Case studies attest to the diversity of local-scale actors that can be incited to oppose fossil
fuel projects, including residents, farmers, ranchers, indigenous peoples, church groups and
health professionals (Bomberg 2017; Cheon and Urpelainen 2018; Connor 2016; Connor et al.
2009; Ordner 2017). The concrete, local struggles that unite these groups, moreover, raise the
12 For another example, see Connor, Freeman and Higginbotham (2009, 502–503).
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potential for Bsmall victories^ in ways that campaigns on climate change per se do not, and
such victories reinforce the sense of hope and collective efficacy necessary to sustain social
movement engagement over time (McAdam 2017, 205).
Anti-fossil fuel frames also facilitate alliance-building and multi-level network-formation
between these local actors and larger environmental groups motivated primarily by the climate
impacts of proposed projects (Bomberg 2017; Connor 2016, 239; Connor et al. 2009; Hopke
2016). The two have complementary resources that enhance the effectiveness of their combined
activism: from the larger groups, the local actors can gain information, technical expertise,
logistical support, access to policymakers, and access to loose networks at larger scales (national,
regional, transnational and Btranslocal^); meanwhile, local actors bring local knowledge (e.g., of
local fossil fuel impacts), denser, local-scale networks, and powerful symbolic resources (e.g.,
locally resonant stories, images andmessengers) that global climate change campaigns often lack
(Bomberg 2017; Connor 2016; Connor et al. 2009; Hopke 2016). While these interactions
among diverse constituencies sometimes create tensions (Connor 2016, 239), there is plenty of
evidence that they can also expand the knowledge, concerns and identities of participants;
farmers become climate activists, and climate activists becomes indigenous rights advocates,
for example (Connor et al. 2009, 506–9; Ordner 2016, 162). These movement-building impacts
are likely to have longer-term strategic benefits, irrespective of the outcomes of specific fossil
fuel projects/campaigns (Connor et al. 2009, 506–9; Ordner 2016, 162).
The concentration of moral pressure onto target companies/industries, discussed earlier, can
also undermine the latter’s external relationships. Specifically, it can help to isolate them from
private supporters and enabling institutions (e.g., sources of finance and cultural legitimacy)
who may be more sensitive than fossil fuel companies themselves to the effects of such
pressure on their own reputations, legitimacy and/or profits (Devers et al. 2009; King and
Pearce 2010, 255–56). AFFNs arguably have strong potential to achieve such effects, primar-
ily through targeting institutional investors and educational, religious and cultural institutions
that enable or support fossil fuels (Ayling and Gunningham 2017; Gunningham 2017b;
Seidman 2015; and see, e.g., Rainforest Action Network et al. 2017).
Ultimately, effective political mobilization against fossil fuel industry targets can cause
delays to or cancelations of planned projects, and can raise political and legal risks that interact
with economic variables to affect the viability of projects—as campaigns against US coal-fired
power stations, Canadian tar sands projects, and north American pipeline projects attest
(Cheon and Urpelainen 2018; Sanzillo et al. 2014). Such mobilization also has the potential
to change electoral outcomes by shifting the composition of advocacy coalitions and altering
public opinion, facilitating the (full or partial) institutionalization of specific movement goals
into policy and/or enabling wider climate-energy policy shifts (Cheon and Urpelainen 2018;
Schifeling and Hoffman 2017). These domestic outcomes, in turn, can strengthen global
AFFNs (Bno new oil pipelines^; Bphase out coal^ etc.).
3.2 International socialization
The second set of processes by which AFFNs are likely to spread and affect states occurs at the
international level and involves attempts by norm champions—and for simplicity I will here
focus only on state norm champions—to socialize other states (Btarget states^) to adopt an
AFFN.
The analysis below makes the following assumptions, drawing on the literature on state
socialization. First, it is assumed that the state is a corporate agent and that it is thus
Climatic Change
meaningful to conceptualize it as a distinct agent, while recognizing that its behaviour is a
function of many individual persons’ behaviour and interactions (Flockhart 2006). Sec-
ond, following Flockhart (2006), a distinction is drawn between a state’s political elite
(here defined as government officials) and the wider public, represented by the civil
society (as depicted in Section 3.1, above). Third, it is assumed that the tactics by which
a norm champion may seek to socialize a target state (via its government officials) include
modeling appropriate behaviour (i.e. leading by example) (Thies 2003, 548–49), persua-
sion (attempting to change another’s mind using argument, without overt coercion) and
social influence (eliciting pro-norm behavior through the distribution of social rewards
and punishments such as praise/blame, esteem/disesteem, back-patting/opprobrium, inclu-
sion/exclusion) (Johnston 2001, 496–506).13 Together, these assumptions allow a more
detailed specification of hypotheses about the micro-processes by which norm champions’
socialization tactics induce target states to adopt AFFNs.
Fourth, it is assumed that the motivations of states to adopt norms in light of socialization
tactics may range from, at one extreme, a dominant Blogic of appropriateness^, whereby the
target state accepts that the new norm constitutes appropriate behaviour for it, in light of its
perceived international identity or role conception (e.g. Bdeveloped state^, Bliberal state^) to, at
the other extreme, a dominant Blogic of consequences^, whereby the target state adopts the new
norm because it rationally calculates that the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs (March and
Olsen 1996; cf. Choi 2015). In practice, a mixture of these Bideal-type^ motivations is typical,
and states’/officials’ particular mix of motivations will differ from context to context (Choi
2015). This assumption facilitates flexibility in the analysis of state motivations for adopting
AFFNs, recognizing that appropriateness and consequence logics may be convergent in some
cases, divergent in others (Choi 2015, 120–22). It also facilitates rational choice analysis that
aggregates social benefits (and costs) to states/officials, such as enhanced international reputa-
tion or status from adopting an AFFN, with material costs (and benefits), such as the domestic
net economic costs of implementing such a norm (Johnston 2001, 502–6).
3.2.1 Targeting potential early adopters
It is hypothesized that, in the early stages of an AFFN’s international diffusion, rational norm
champion states will use a combination of persuasion and modeling to try to socialize early
adopters, and will focus on target states that meet the following two criteria: (i) the target state
has an international identity or role conception linked to strong climate action, such that non-
adoption of the AFFN would be strongly dissonant (e.g., the state identifies as a Bclimate
leader^ or, more generally, a Bprogressive^ state); and (ii) the perceived material costs to the
target state from adopting the AFFN are low (e.g., the state is not a major producer or
consumer of the relevant type of fossil fuel).
This hypothesis reflects the greater effectiveness of persuasion among like-minded peers
relative to social influence tactics when a norm is not yet widely adopted among states
(Johnston 2001, 509–10). Social influence tactics are likely to be relatively ineffective in the
early stage of a norm’s diffusion because the (international) social benefits accruing to early
norm adopters are likely to be relatively low (Johnston 2001, 503–6). Accordingly, rational
13 This definition of socialization excludes coercion and the provision of material incentives (e.g. side-payments
or sanctions). Scholars differ as to whether they include one or both of these within their definitions of
socialization (compare, e.g., Flockhart 2006; Johnston 2001; Thies 2003, 548).
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AFFN champions will seek to persuade state peers who share a common (climate-progressive)
identity and face low material costs to adopting the AFFN. Modeling appropriate behaviour
also seems likely to be prevalent as an early stage tactic, as this allows for evidence of causal
effectiveness to be accumulated and enhances norm champions’ legitimacy, thus
complementing persuasion tactics.
The launch at COP23 (November 2017) of the new Powering Past Coal Alliance illustrates
the plausibility of this hypothesis. The Alliance consists of national and provincial govern-
ments committed to phasing out unabated coal-fired power generation within their jurisdiction.
Led by the UK and Canada, the Alliance’s founding members are mostly developed European
countries, wealthier US and Canadian provinces, and small island developing states
(Government of Canada 2017). Most of these jurisdictions have a pre-existing climate-
progressive identity. And most have relatively few coal-fired power stations14 meaning the
material costs of adopting this AFFN are low. Modeling tactics were prominent among the
Alliance’s founding members: a number of them had made unilateral coal phase-out commit-
ments prior to joining the alliance (see Littlecott and Webb 2017), and the timing and fanfare
associated with the launch at COP23 were clearly orchestrated to model appropriate behaviour
(see Webb and Littlecott 2017). The Alliance Declaration, moreover, clearly states the
intention of the founding members to use persuasion tactics to expand membership of the
Alliance: it states that BWe will also encourage our peers to join us in powering past coal to
build a better world for our children and grandchildren^, and declares the goal of having 50
members by COP24 in December 2018 (Government of Canada 2017).
3.2.2 Positive feedback effects: rising social costs of non-adoption, norm cascades,
and domestic interactions
The diffusion of norms is not, however, simply a matter of persuading states, one-by-one;
cases of successful international norm diffusion are characterized by positive feedback mech-
anisms. Specifically, we can expect the use of social influence tactics, and hence the identity
dissonance and/or social costs (e.g., international opprobrium, reputational damage) to a non-
adopting state, to grow as a function of the number of other states that have adopted the norm
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 902–4; Johnston 2001, 503–10). This feature of norm diffusion
gives rise to Btipping^ dynamics: once a Bcritical mass^ of states adopts a norm—possibly as a
result of the norm’s institutionalization—a Bcascade^ will be triggered, whereby many other
states adopt it in rapid succession (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). It is hypothesized that
AFFNs will follow this norm diffusion pattern (albeit with variation and uncertainty as to the
Bcritical mass^ from norm to norm) among states for whom norm adoption motivations are
mixed and divergent (Choi 2015, 120–22)—i.e., they have either a strong climate-progressive
identity but high perceived material costs of adoption (Norway is perhaps a good example in
relation to AFFNs pertaining to oil) or a weak climate-progressive identity but low perceived
material costs of adoption. For such states, the rising social costs of non-adoption (social
benefits of adoption) as the norm spreads are likely to tip them toward adoption.
Of course, there are likely to be holdout states that resist AFFNs’ diffusion. We can
hypothetically expect states with powerful and/or growing fossil fuel industries, and which
do not identify as progressive climate leaders, to take such a position (Saudi Arabia and Russia
are perhaps good examples). For such states, rational calculation is likely to be their dominant
14 Collectively, the signatories account for less than 3% of global coal use (Plumer and Popovich 2017).
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motivation and the perceived material benefits of non-adoption are likely to exceed the
associated social costs. Indeed, due to the operation of global market forces, the material
economic benefits of non-cooperation are likely to grow as a function of the number of other
states adopting AFFNs (Collier and Venables 2015).
AFFNs will not magically dissolve the material incentives for certain countries to produce
and consume fossil fuels. The crucial point is, rather, that the feedback mechanisms associated
with the spread of norms will nonetheless affect theses states. Theory on norm diffusion
predicts that the social costs—to reputation, status etc.—on holdouts of failing to adopt a norm
will become highly intense when only a few of them remain (Collier and Venables 2015, 503–
4; Jacquet 2015, 71–74). Consequently, holdout states must spend considerable political/
diplomatic capital to mitigate international opprobrium (see, e.g., Klotz 2002 on apartheid
South Africa and pre-abolition USA). Over time, these costs can become unsustainable,
leading to a change of position.
Additionally, these international pressures can have positive feedback effects within the
civil society of holdout states that can also lead to a shift in position over time. These can be
theorized as interactions between the international socialization processes discussed here and
the domestic political mobilization processes discussed in Section 3.1. First, widely adopted
global norms can provide a focal point around which civil society actors in holdout states can
mobilize and which legitimizes their claims (Dai 2010). Second, widely adopted norms
provide a benchmark against which a holdout state can be held accountable by third parties,
including domestic civil society actors, even though that state has not adopted the norm. This
further increases the moral and political pressure on states to adopt the norm (Dai 2010; Keck
and Sikkink 1998, 24). As AFFNs become more widespread, opportunities will arise to test
these hypotheses. Tracking the spread and effects of the Powering Past Coal Alliance
(discussed above) would, for example, be a fruitful topic of future research.
4 Conclusion
This article has sought to draw attention to, and explain the logic of, an emerging and
promising phenomenon in global climate governance. It has argued, first, that international
structural conditions are more conducive than at any previous time to the spread of AFFNs
(see Online Resource 1). In particular, AFFNs cohere with, and take forward, the logics of
Bpolitical mobilization^ and Bpeer pressure^ at the heart of the Paris Agreement. Second, it
argued that AFFNs are likely to continue to be originated and advocated by various kinds of
norm entrepreneurs and champions. Third and most significantly, it identified two channels—
domestic political mobilization by civil society actors, and international socialization by states
(and non-state actors)—by which AFFNs are most likely to spread widely throughout the
international system, and to affect the identity-related considerations or rational calculations of
states in the direction of limiting or reducing fossil fuel production or consumption.
AFFNs provide fertile ground for future multidisciplinary research in numerous directions.
First, detailed case studies of specific anti-fossil fuel initiatives, and resulting AFFNs, would
provide valuable tests of and refinements to the arguments developed here, while also
contributing to the development of the wider literature on global moral norms. Second,
comparative studies could help to identify systematic variation in the conditions affecting
the strength of the causal mechanisms identified in Section 3. For example, domestic civil
society mobilization is likely to be less effective in countries where the political space for such
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mobilization is narrow (Falkner 2016, 1123; Flockhart 2006, 105–8). Third, more research is
needed on the complementarities and/or tensions between AFFNs (the Bnegative^ goals) and
other desirable climate-related norms, frames and initiatives, such as 100% renewable energy /
green transformation (the Bpositive^ goals) and Bjust transition^ (the hinge between the
negative and positive goals) (Green 2017; see Online Resource 1, sec. 3).
It is hoped that this article will contribute to a greater understanding among climate
governance scholars of this promising new mode of climate governance, will tempt interna-
tional relations scholars of moral norms to engage more closely with climate and energy issues,
and will assist AFFN champions to maximize the effects of their initiatives to mobilize civil
society and socialize states.
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